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Abstract
Fixed points of the (most) reﬁned best-reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg,
Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2009), in the agent normal form of extensive form games have a
remarkable, one might call subgame consistency property. They automatically induce ﬁxed
points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of every subgame. Furthermore,
in a well-deﬁned sense ﬁxed points of this correspondence reﬁne even trembling-hand perfect
equilibria, while, on the other hand, reasonable equilibria that are not even weak perfect
Bayesian are ﬁxed points of this correspondence.
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11 Introduction
What constitutes a “reasonable” backward induction solution to an extensive form game is
debatable. The ﬁrst concept developed to eliminate some commonly agreed-on unreasonable
Nash equilibria is Selten’s (1965) subgame perfection. Yet, there are many subgame perfect
equilibria that researchers agreed on are not reasonable. Selten (1975) introduced the concept
of an extensive form trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
of the agent normal form of the game to further eliminate unreasonable equilibria. This concept,
while in many ways a ﬁne one, was “recast and slightly weakened” by Kreps and Wilson (1982)
in their sequential equilibrium. Kreps and Wilson (1982) also coined the terms “assessment”
and “sequential rationality”, now to be found in every textbook on game theory. Kreps and
Wilson (1982) thus oﬀer a reinterpretation of (a slightly weaker notion than) extensive form
trembling-hand perfect equilibria, in terms of what players believe about what happened so
far in the game (when it is their turn to move) and what they should choose given that and
given the likely continuation of other players after them. One commonly agreed-on problem
of the concept of sequential equilibrium is that, while it is based on these assessments, their
justiﬁcation is still derived from trembles. This is commonly considered theoretically clumsy.1
Various attempts were made to get rid of these trembles, while maintaining the concept’s other
attractive properties. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991b) introduce a notion of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium with this view in mind. Much like subgame perfection a variant of this notion,
now often called weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (see e.g. (Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green
1995, Deﬁnition 9.C.3) or (Ritzberger 2002, Deﬁnition 6.2)) and deﬁned for all extensive form
games, is now commonly considered a minimal requirement for a reasonable solution to extensive
form games. Battigalli (1996) demonstrates that Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1991b) “generally
reasonable extended assessment[s] ... may violate independence, full consistency, and invariance
with respect to interchanging of essentially simultaneous moves.”, where full consistency is the
criterion an assessment has to justify in addition to the strategy proﬁle being sequentially rational
to obtain a sequential equilibrium.
Thus, eﬀorts have been made to ﬁnd conditions on assessments (not based on trembles) such
that ultimately we obtain sequential equilibria, if not extensive form trembling-hand equilibria.
On the other hand, however, there are strategy proﬁles which are trembling-hand equilibria
(or even only weak perfect Bayesian) that are not unreasonable. In all these solution concepts
assessments generally need to be justiﬁed by the same strategy-proﬁle for all players. It is
not a priori clear why this is a reasonable requirement (see the game in Figure 4 in Section
4). Indeed (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991a, pp. 332-333), Bonanno (1995), and Battigalli (1996)
argue that this is not a necessary requirement of a reasonable solution and allow for heterogeneous
assessments. We even argue (see the game in Figure 5 in Section 4) that a player might randomize
(at least in the mind of her opponents) over two or more pure strategies, where each pure strategy
is independently justiﬁable by a fully consistent (or some such requirement) assessment, but the
mixture itself is not.
We ﬁrst prove that ﬁxed points of the reﬁned best-reply correspondence, introduced by
Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2009), in the agent normal form of an extensive form
game2 have the remarkable conceptual consistency property that they automatically induce
1Another argument against these trembles underlying the justiﬁcation of assessments but not of strategy
choices, is that it is impractical. See (Battigalli 1996, p. 203).
2Such ﬁxed points can be understood as the potential convergence points of a (most reﬁned, while perhaps
2ﬁxed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of every subgame.
We then prove that ﬁxed points of this reﬁned best-reply correspondence, in the agent normal
form, satisfy exactly the properties discussed above. Each pure strategy that is used by some
player with positive probability must be justiﬁed by, in fact, a stronger requirement than full
consistency (even stronger than trembling-hand perfection). However, there does not need to
be one assessment justifying all these pure strategies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the necessary deﬁnitions. The subgame
consistency property as well as a full characterization of ﬁxed points of the reﬁned best-reply
correspondence of the agent normal form are both stated and proven in Section 3. This section
also contains the result that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in generic extensive form
games of perfect information is the unique rationalizable strategy proﬁle under the reﬁned best
reply correspondence. This section, ﬁnally, also contains a brief discussion of the (ideological)
relationship of ﬁxed points of the reﬁned best reply correspondence to Fudenberg and Levine’s
(1993) self-conﬁrming equilibria. Section 4 provides examples demonstrating the degree of “rea-
sonableness” of ﬁxed points of the reﬁned best-reply correspondence, while also documenting
one ﬂaw. Finally, we conclude without conclusion, but with two appendices. Appendix A
demonstrates how, not surprisingly, none of our results extend to ﬁxed points of the reﬁned
best-reply correspondence for the reduced normal form of an extensive form game. Appendix B
demonstrates that rationalizability based on the reﬁned best-reply correspondence in the agent
normal form has no connection to forward induction reasoning and, thus, very little in common,
with the notion of extensive form rationalizability of Pearce (1984) and Battigalli (1997).
2 Preliminaries
Let Γ = (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite n-player normal form game, where I = {1,...,n} is the set of players,
S = ×i∈ISi is the set of pure strategy proﬁles, and u : S → IRn the payoﬀ function3. Let
Θi = ∆(Si) denote the set of player i’s mixed strategies, and let Θ = ×i∈IΘi denote the set of
all mixed strategy proﬁles. Let int(Θ) = {x ∈ Θ : xis > 0 ∀s ∈ Si ∀i ∈ I} denote the set of all
completely mixed strategy proﬁles.
For x ∈ Θ let Bi(x) ⊂ Si denote the set of pure-strategy best-replies to x for player i. Let
B(x) = ×i∈IBi(x). Let βi(x) = ∆(Bi(x)) ⊂ Θi denote the set of mixed-strategy best-replies to
x for player i. Let β(x) = ×i∈Iβi(x).
As in Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2009) we shall restrict attention to games with
a normal form in which the set of mixed-strategy proﬁles Ψ = {x ∈ Θ| B(x) is a singleton} is
dense in Θ. We denote this class by G∗.
Not every normal form derived from even a generic extensive form game of perfect infor-
mation (GEFGOPI) is in G∗. Consider the 1-player extensive form game, given in Figure 1, in
which at node 1 the player has two choices, L and R, where L terminates the game, while R
leads to a second node, where the player again faces two choices l and r. The two pure strate-
gies Ll and Lr are obviously equivalent. The semi-reduced normal form has been introduced to
eliminate exactly this type of equivalences. The semi-reduced normal form of any GEFGOPI
not necessarily most plausible) learning dynamics. See Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2009). While this
dynamics is deﬁned for normal form games, there are no problems with extending it to extensive form games, as
long as we look at convergence points from interior states only, thus always reaching all information sets. Note
that these convergence points may well satisfy more stringent properties than the ones we characterize here.
3The function u will also denote the expected utility function in the mixed extension of the game Γ.
3is again in G∗. In the appendix in Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2009) it is generally
demonstrated that generic ﬁnite extensive form games have semi-reduced normal forms that are
in G∗. Also the agent normal form of such games is in G∗ as long as no player has 2 or more
equivalent actions at any of her information sets.
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Figure 1: A 1-player extensive form game.
For games in G∗ let σ : Θ ⇒ Θ be the reﬁned best-reply correspondence as deﬁned in
Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2009) and as follows. For x ∈ Θ let
Si(x) = {si ∈ Si| ∃{xt}∞
t=1 ∈ Ψ : xt → x ∧ Bi(xt) = {si} ∀t}.
Then σi(x) = ∆(Si(x)) and σ(x) = ×i∈Iσi(x) ∀ x ∈ Θ.
3 Results
Fixed points of σ in the agent normal form have a surprising property. They induce ﬁxed points
of σ in every subgame. This is much more than saying that ﬁxed points of σ are subgame
perfect. One might call it a conceptual consistency property.
Proposition 1 Let Γ ∈ G∗ be the agent normal form of a given extensive form game. Then if
a strategy proﬁle x is a ﬁxed point of σ it is also a ﬁxed point of σ in the agent normal form of
every subgame of this extensive form game.
Proof: Let Γ ∈ G∗ be the agent normal form of the given extensive form game. Let Θ denote
the space of mixed strategies. Let x ∈ Θ be a ﬁxed point of σ. Consider player (agent) i ∈ I,
where I is the set of all agents. Player i only moves once, i.e., has only one information set. By
the deﬁnition of σi(x) = ∆(Si(x)), player i, in xi ∈ σi(x) is exclusively randomizing over pure
strategies, each of which are unique best replies to some x′ ∈ Θ (possibly diﬀerent for diﬀerent
si ∈ Si) in a neighborhood of x. In fact, for each si ∈ Si(x), and, hence, for each si ∈ C(xi)
we have that there is a sequence of xt ∈ Θ such that xt → x and Bi(xt) = {si}. Now consider
any subgame in which player i also moves. Let Γ′ = (I′,S′,u′) denote its agent normal form.
Obviously I′ ⊂ I and for all i ∈ I′ we have S′
i = Si and u′ is deﬁned accordingly. Now for every
si ∈ C(xi) consider the projection of xt ∈ Θ onto the reduced game Γ′. Let it be denoted by
ˆ xt ∈ Θ′. Hence we simply have that ˆ xt
i = xt
i for all i ∈ I′. Now consider for the exact sequence
of xt ∈ Θ such that xt → x and Bi(xt) = {si} its projection. Obviously we have that ˆ xt → ˆ x
and also we must have that B′
i(ˆ xt) ⊂ Bi(xt). This is so because either in x player i’s information
is reached, in which case player i’s best responses cannot change in the subgame, or player i’s
information set is not reached in x, and, hence, every strategy of player i is a best response
against x in the full game. But now given Bi(xt) = {si} we must also have B′
i(ˆ xt) = {si} for the
4whole sequence of ˆ xt. But this is nothing but saying that si ∈ S′
i(ˆ x) and, as this is true for all
si ∈ C(xi) and all players i ∈ I′ we have that ˆ x is a ﬁxed point of σ in Γ′. QED
In fact a ﬁxed point of σ of the agent normal form of an extensive form game is both stronger
in some respects and weaker in others than a sequential equilibrium. To clarify these issues we
separate the equilibrium deﬁnitions of the various equilibrium concepts into parts.
For a given strategy proﬁle x ∈ Θ in the agent normal form of an extensive form game Γ let
µ be a system of probability distributions, one for each information set (and, thus, one for each
agent) of the extensive form game. This system µ, which must be derived from x using Bayes’
rule whenever possible, is often called a system of beliefs and the pair (x,µ) an assessment.
Recall that C(xi) ⊂ Θi denotes the support of mixed strategy xi of player i. Given assessment
(x,µ) we call si ∈ C(xi) sequentially rational if it maximizes the conditional expected payoﬀ
given (x,µ) at agent i’s (only) information set.
Deﬁnition 1 A strategy proﬁle x ∈ Θ, in the agent normal form of an extensive form game, is
very weakly idio-justiﬁable if for every si ∈ C(xi) and every player i ∈ I there is a system of
beliefs µ = µ(si) such that si is sequentially rational given (x,µ). It is weakly idio-justiﬁable
if for every si ∈ C(xi) and every player i ∈ I there is sequence of assessments (xk,µk) such
that xk is in the strict interior of Θ and converges to x and µk is the appropriate and unique
system of beliefs derived from xk using Bayes’ rule and converges to µ = µ(si) such that si is
sequentially rational for player i given (x,µ). It is strongly idio-justiﬁable if it is weakly
idio-justiﬁable and each si ∈ C(xi) is also sequentially rational for every assessment along the
sequence. It is very strongly idio-justiﬁable if for every si ∈ C(xi) and every player i ∈ I
there is an open set Ux ⊂ int(Θ), with closure containing x, such that si is sequentially rational
also for all assessments (x′,µ′), where x′ ∈ Ux and µ′ derived from x′ using Bayes’ rule. A
strategy proﬁle is very weakly, weakly, strongly, or very strongly pan-justiﬁable if it is
very weakly, weakly, strongly, or very strongly idio-justiﬁable, respectively, and, in addition, the
assessment, or the sequence or open set of assessments, that respectively justiﬁes any one of the
various pure strategies si ∈ C(xi) for the various players i ∈ I is the same for all si ∈ Ci(xi)
and all players i ∈ I.
Note that when a possibly mixed strategy proﬁle x is idio-justiﬁable (of some degree) it
means that each of its parts, i.e. each pure strategy in the support of some player’s strategy
part of x, is idiosyncratically justiﬁable through its very own assessment, or sequence of
assessments, or open set of assessments (depending on which degree of idio-justiﬁability we
speak of). Thus, even for a single player we might have two diﬀerent assessments justifying two
diﬀerent pure strategies in the support of this player’s mixed strategy. When a possibly mixed
strategy proﬁle x is pan-justiﬁable (of some degree) it means that it is idio-justiﬁable (of the
same degree) and, in addition, there is a single assessment, or sequence of assessments, or open
set of assessment, that justiﬁes all pure strategies in the support of any player’s part of x.
Obviously very strong idio-justiﬁability implies strong idio-justiﬁability, which implies weak
idio-justiﬁability, which, in turn, implies very weak idio-justiﬁability. The same is true for the
respective four notions of pan-justiﬁability. Also any level of pan-justiﬁability implies the same
level of idio-justiﬁability by deﬁnition. However there are no other relationships. I.e., it is not
true that very strong idio-justiﬁability implies even very weak pan-consistency.
Using these deﬁnitions we can give characterizations of the various equilibrium notions in
terms of these properties. A strategy proﬁle x is weak perfect Bayesian (see e.g., Deﬁnition 9.C.3
5in Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green (1995) or Deﬁnition 6.2 in Ritzberger (2002)) if and only
if it is very weakly pan-justiﬁable. Note that, although there is a unique assessment that thus
justiﬁes a weak-perfect Bayesian equilibrium, this does not imply that the beliefs of any two
agents, whose information sets are oﬀ the equilibrium path, have to be in any way consistent.
It only requires that if one-player uses two or more pure strategies in this equilibrium, all these
have to be justiﬁable by the same assessment. A strategy proﬁle is then sequential (Kreps and
Wilson (1982)), i.e. its assessment is fully consistent (Battigalli (1996)), if and only if it is weakly
pan-justiﬁable. Note that weak pan-justiﬁability does require consistency of beliefs of players.
A strategy proﬁle is extensive form trembling hand perfect (Selten (1975)) if and only if it is
strongly pan-justiﬁable. Note that they all share the pan preﬁx. A ﬁxed point of σ in the agent
normal form of an extensive form game does not satisfy any of these pan-notions as the game
in Figure 5 in Section 4 demonstrates. However, any ﬁxed point of σ in the agent normal form
of an extensive form game is very strongly idio-justiﬁable.
Proposition 2 Let Γ ∈ G∗ be the agent normal form of an extensive form game. A strategy
proﬁle x is a ﬁxed point of σ if and only if it is very-strongly idio-justiﬁable.
Proof: Let si be in the support of player i’s part of x, i.e. si ∈ C(xi). Strategy proﬁle x is a ﬁxed
point of σ if and only if, by the deﬁnition of σ, there is an open set Ux ⊂ int(Θ) with closure
containing x, such that si ∈ Bi(y) for any y ∈ Ux. Note that this set Ux in general depends
on the player i and on pure strategy si and can well be diﬀerent for diﬀerent pure strategies
and diﬀerent players. For all these y there is a unique system of beliefs µy derived from y using
Bayes’ rule. Again, the thus derived beliefs µy can be diﬀerent for diﬀerent pure strategies
s′
i ∈ C(xi) and for diﬀerent players. Then si ∈ Bi(y) if and only if it is also sequentially rational
given (y,µy). QED
Thus ﬁxed points of σ of the agent normal form of an extensive form game are more strongly
justiﬁable than weak-perfect Bayesian, sequential, and extensive form trembling hand equilibria
in terms of our notion of idio-justiﬁability. Thus, every single pure strategy used in a ﬁxed point
of σ is justiﬁable in a very strong sense. The sense in which ﬁxed points of σ are weaker than
even weak perfect Bayesian equilibria is that for ﬁxed points of σ we cannot necessarily guarantee
that the system (or systems) of beliefs that justiﬁes any single pure strategy in its support is the
same that justiﬁes other pure strategies in its support. This is, thus, reminiscent of Fudenberg
and Levine’s (1993) self-conﬁrming equilibria, in which players can disagree about other players’
strategies. Note, however, that for ﬁxed points in σ in the agent normal form, players can only
disagree about how to interpret deviations from the prescribed strategy proﬁle. They cannot
disagree as to what a given player’s originally intended strategy choice was. Thus, ﬁxed points
of σ can remain to be Nash equilibria, while even the most stringent of self-conﬁrming equilibria,
which are the rationalizable self-conﬁrming equilibria of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (1999),
may not be Nash equilibria. In some sense, thus, ﬁxed points of σ of the agent normal form are
highly justiﬁable self-conﬁrming equilibria within the bounds of being Nash equilibria as well.
Corollary 1 Let Γ ∈ G∗ be the agent normal form of an extensive form game. Then if a pure
strategy proﬁle s is a ﬁxed point of σ it induces a weak-perfect Bayesian equilibrium in every
subgame.
Proof: follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 2 and the realization that there is only one
strategy in the support of each players xi. QED
6Still, Corollary 1 is really a gross understatement, as we know from Proposition 2. Another
example that demonstrates that being a pure ﬁxed points of σ is a much stronger requirement
than being a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the game in Figure 2, which is taken from
(Battigalli 1996, Fig. 1). In this game (R1,R2,R3) is weak perfect Bayesian for all u ≤ 1. Note
ﬁrst that R is strictly dominant for player 1. However, for all strategy proﬁles close to player 1
playing R1, R3 is only best on a thin set (where player 2 puts probability 0 on L2). Thus, R3
is not in S3(x) for any x ∈ Θ close to (R1,R2,R3). Thus (R1,R2,R3) is not a ﬁxed point of σ.
Indeed, the only ﬁxed point of σ is the “reasonable” equilibrium R1,L2,L3.
R1 L1
1
R2
0,0,0
L2
R2
1,1,2
L2
2
3
R3
0,0,1
L3
0,0,u
R3
1,0,0
L3
1,2,1
Figure 2: A game with a pure weakly perfect Bayesian equilibrium (R,R,R) for all u ≤ 1, which is not a
ﬁxed point of σ.
Deﬁne a notion of rationalizability (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984)) based on σ as
follows. For A ⊂ Θ let Si(A) =
S
x∈A Si(x). Let σi(A) = ∆(Si(A)). Let σ(A) = ×i∈Iσi(A).
For k ≥ 2 let σk(A) = σ
￿
σk−1(A)
￿
. For A = Θ, σk(A) is a decreasing sequence, and we denote
σ∞(Θ) =
T∞
k=1 τk(Θ) the set of σ-rationalizable strategies.
Proposition 3 Let Γ ∈ G∗ be the agent normal form of a generic extensive form game of perfect
(and complete) information (GEFGOPI). Then only the (unique) subgame-perfect strategy proﬁle
is σ-rationalizable.
Proof: Consider a ﬁnal node. A strategy, available to the player, say, i at this node, which is not
subgame perfect is weakly dominated. Hence, it can not be in Si(x) for any x ∈ Θ. So it is not
in σ(Θ). Now consider an immediate predecessor node to the above ﬁnal node. A non-subgame
perfect strategy at this node can only be a best-reply if the behavior at the following nodes is
non-subgame perfect. For any x ∈ Θ in a neighborhood of σ(Θ) this is still true. Hence, any
such non-subgame perfect strategy at this node can not be in σ2(Θ). This argument can be
reiterated any ﬁnite number of times. QED
Corollary 2 Let Γ ∈ G∗ be the agent normal form of a GEFGOPI. The only ﬁxed point of σ
for this game is the (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof: Every ﬁxed point of σ must be in the set of σ-rationalizable strategies. This set, by
Proposition 3, only consists of the subgame perfect equilibrium. QED
This corollary also follows from Proposition 1 and the fact that σ is a reﬁnement of β.
74 Examples
Our ﬁrst example demonstrates that not every sequential equilibrium is necessarily a ﬁxed point
of σ. The game given in Figure 3, Figure 13 in Kreps and Wilson (1982), has a sequential
equilibrium (L,r) which is not a ﬁxed point of σ (it is, in fact, also not perfect). Here the agent
normal form and the semi-reduced normal form are the same and given as Game 1. This game
demonstrates that some (very) unreasonable sequential equilibria (here one that involves playing
a pure weakly dominated strategy) are reﬁned away by appealing to ﬁxed points of σ.
R L
1
r
−1,−1
l
2,0
r
1,1
l
1,1
2 l r
L 1,1 1,1
R 2,0 -1,-1
Figure 3: A game with a sequential equilib-
rium (L,r) which is not a ﬁxed point of σ.
Game 1: The normal form of the game in Fig-
ure 3.
The following example demonstrates that ﬁxed points of σ, while very strongly idio-
justiﬁable, are not weakly pan-justiﬁable in the sense that two players, who in a sequential
equilibrium have to have the same assessment, are allowed to have diﬀerent assessments in ﬁxed
points of σ. Consider the game in Figure 4. The Nash equilibrium (A,R,r) is a ﬁxed point of
σ, but is not sequential (and, hence, not extensive form trembling hand perfect).
C A
1,1,1
B
1
R
1,0,0
L
R
1,1,0
L
2
3
r
0,2,1
l
0,2,0
r
0,0,0
l
0,0,2
Figure 4: A game in which there is a ﬁxed point of σ in the agent normal form which is not sequential
(and, hence, not extensive form trembling hand perfect).
To see that (A,R,r) is a ﬁxed point of σ we need to check that each strategy choice is a best
reply in an open set around (A,R,r). For player 1’s choice A this is deﬁnitely true as A weakly
dominates both B and C. Player 2’s choice R is best as long as player 1 is suﬃciently more
likely to tremble to C than to B. In fact the probability of C has to be at least twice that of B.
Player 2’s payoﬀs are unaﬀected by player 3’s choice. Player 3’s choice r is best as long as player
1 trembles suﬃciently more to B than to C. In fact the probability of B has to be at least twice
that of C. This is true for whatever player 2 does. Hence, for each player’s strategy choice there
is an open set of strategy proﬁles around (A,R,r) against which the player’s choice is a best
reply. Hence, (A,R,r) is indeed a ﬁxed point of σ. However, these open sets (for players 2 and
83) are mutually exclusive. This in turn means that there is no system of consistent beliefs for
players 2 and 3 which make both choices R and r best replies simultaneously. Player 2’s belief
that sustains the (A,R,r) equilibrium is such that his ﬁrst node has conditional probability of
at most 1/3. Player 3’s belief that sustains the (A,R,r) equilibrium is such that her ﬁrst node
has conditional probability of at least 2/3. But in a sequential equilibrium these two beliefs
would have to coincide. Thus this (A,R,r) is not sequential (and not trembling-hand perfect).
The next example (Game 5)demonstrates that a mixed ﬁxed-point of σ need not be even
weak perfect Bayesian. Thus, a very strongly idio-justiﬁable equilibrium does not even need to
be very weakly pan-justiﬁable. However, we argue that this ﬁxed point of σ is very reasonable.
C A
4,0
B
1
R
0,0
L
6,6
M
5,5
R
6,6
L
0,0
M
5,5
2
Figure 5: A game in which there is a ﬁxed point of σ in the agent normal form which is not weak perfect
Bayesian.
Consider the strategy proﬁle x∗, in which player 1 plays A and player 2 puts probability 1
2
each on L and R. Note ﬁrst that this is indeed a Nash equilibrium as A is best when player
2 behaves thus, and player 2 is indiﬀerent between all strategies when player 1 chooses A. To
see that this is also a ﬁxed point of σ note that A continues to be the unique best response
of player 1 in a small enough neighborhood of player 2’s strategy. Strategy L for player 2 is
a unique best reply for some open set of mixed strategy proﬁles close to x∗, all these that put
suﬃciently higher probability on player 1’s B than on C. Similarly player 2’s strategy R is the
unique best reply for some open set of mixed strategy proﬁles close to x∗, all these that put
suﬃciently higher probability on player 1’s C than on B. Thus x∗ ∈ σ(x∗). However, x∗ is not
weak perfect Bayesian. There is in fact no assessment of player 2’s that would make player 1’s
best response randomizing equally between L and R. This is so, because, to induce player 2 to
randomize she has to be indiﬀerent between both strategies, which is only true if her assessment
is that both nodes in her information set are equally likely. In that case, however, player 2’s
strategy M dominates.
There is, however, a very good case to be made that x∗ is indeed reasonable. This is so, if
we interpret a mixed strategy proﬁle not so much as a probability distribution over the actual
pure strategies chosen, but rather a belief of opponent players about this players choice of pure
strategy. In the case at hand the argument would be as follows. Player 1 chooses A because
player 1 does not know how player 2 would interpret a deviation to either B or C, which
player 2 cannot distinguish. Player 1 might think it is equally likely that player 2 will react by
playing L or by playing R (because, presumably player 2 has a clear assessment of player 1’s
intended choice, only player 1 does not know what that is). Thus, this equilibrium, interpreted
as beliefs about opponent strategies, is completely reasonable4. In fact this is a weak perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in this game if we interchange the two players’ essentially simultaneous
moves. Consider the thus modiﬁed game in Figure 6.
4Of course, this game has additional, also reasonable, equilibria, which are also ﬁxed points of σ.
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A
4,0
B
5,5
C
6,6
A
4,0
B
0,0
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Figure 6: This game is derived from the game in Figure 5 by interchanging the two players’ essentially
simultaneous moves.
In this game x∗ is weak perfect Bayesian. In fact, it is even sequential, given that every
information set is reached. This demonstrates the (already mentioned) point made by Battigalli
(1996) that weak perfect Bayesian equilibria are not invariant under the interchanging of essen-
tially simultaneous moves. Fixed points of σ, on the other hand, naturally satisfy this invariance
property as they are deﬁned for the agent normal form of the game, which does not change when
such essentially simultaneous moves are interchanged.
We should note, however, that as much as we think of ﬁxed points of σ in the agent normal
form as the “ultimate” backward induction solution concept, it does have its ﬂaw. It is not
immune to splitting information sets into parts, as the same example demonstrates.
¬A A
4,0
1
C B
1
R
0,0
L
6,6
M
5,5
R
6,6
L
0,0
M
5,5
2
Figure 7: This game is derived from the game in Figure 5 by splitting player 1’s move into two sequential
moves.
Of course, one problem is that this game has a diﬀerent agent normal form, as it now has 3
players. However, that alone is not necessarily a problem. The problem is that in any strategy
proﬁle of the agent normal form of this game, player 1’s choice between B and C now has to
be speciﬁed. This is equivalent to specifying player 1’s possible deviation to B and C in the
original game. Thus player 2 in this game is no longer free to interpret how play arrived at her
information set. While it may be a deviation of the ﬁrst player 1 to play ¬A, it does not take a
deviation of the second player 1 to get to this information set.
Note that x∗, the ﬁxed point of σ in the original game in Figure 5, is still part of a Nash
and Fudenberg and Levine’s (1993) self-conﬁrming equilibrium of this game. It is, however, no
longer (part of) a ﬁxed point of σ in this game (it is not even subgame perfect).
A Semi-reduced normal form
In this appendix we show by example, that none of the results in this paper extend to the semi-
reduced normal form even of a generic extensive form game of perfect information (GEFGOPI).
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1,2
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D E F
A 3,0 3,0 3,0
B 4,3 1,2 1,2
C 4,3 0,1 2,4
Figure 8: A centipede game. Game 2: The normal form game of the cen-
tipede game in Figure 8.
Consider the centipede game (Figure 8.2.2 in Cressman (2003)) given here in Figure 8 with
semi-reduced normal form given as Game 2, where player 1’s strategies are A = Ll|Lr, B = Rl,
and C = Rr, while player 2’s strategies are D = Rl|Rr, E = Ll, and F = Lr. This game
is a GEFGOPI and, hence, has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which is (Lr,Lr). The
non-subgame perfect, non weak-perfect Bayesian, and, hence, non-sequential, Nash equilibrium
(B,D) is a ﬁxed point of σ. So indeed, ﬁxed points of σ in a given normal form game need not
induce sequential or even weak perfect Bayesian equilibria in every extensive form game with
this semi-reduced normal form.
B Forward Induction
In this section we provide a (well-known) example that demonstrates that rationalizability based
on, and ﬁxed points of, the reﬁned best-reply correspondence have no relation to forward induc-
tion solutions.
B O
2,0
A
1
R
0,0
L
3,1
R
1,3
L
0,0
2
Figure 9: Battle of the Sexes with an outside option.
The strategy proﬁle (O,R) is a ﬁxed point of σ. This is so because O is best against an open
set of strategy proﬁles close to player 2’s R and R is best against an open set of strategy proﬁles
close to O (in which player 1 uses B suﬃciently more than A). This emphasizes the fact that
ﬁxed points of σ are exclusively about backward induction, as any deviation from the equilibrium
play is essentially interpreted as a tremble or mistake. This is, thus, fundamentally diﬀerent
from forward induction reasoning. According to forward induction reasoning O,R should not
be played, because a deviation of player 1 into player 2’s information set should be interpreted
by player 2 as a clear attempt to go for the other equilibrium A,L. This is so, if player 2 tries to
maintain as much as possible her original hypothesis that her opponent, player 1, is rational (see
11Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002)). For ﬁxed points of σ any such deviation is simply understood
as a mistake.
This also implies that σ-rationalizability, thus, has not much in common with extensive
form rationalizability (Pearce (1984) and Battigalli (1997)), which, as shown by Battigalli and
Siniscalchi (2002) is almost more related to forward induction than to backward induction.
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